

4 OCTOBER (Thursday)

1. Meeting in Director's office at 1000 on Cuba. (DCI, DDCI, Mr. Helms, Mr. Harvey, and General Lansdale.)
2. Special Group Meeting (According to Minutes, DCI, Dr. Scoville and Mr. Helms also attended.) Subjects: Brazil, "C", and North Vietnam -- Meeting at 1200.

At Special Group (Augmented), upon Mr. McCone's information that U-2 flights were now restricted by SAM sites on SE quadrant, The Group ordered NRO to prepare an overall program for reconnaissance of Cuba for presentation at 9 October meeting. (Lehman Report, p 30, para 61.)

3. Attended with DCI Special Group (Augmented) meeting on Operation MONGOOSE in which Attorney General said that higher authority is concerned about the progress on the Mongoose Program and that more priority should be given to trying to mount Sabotage Operations. (See the attachments.)

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October 4, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF MONGOOSE MEETING HELD ON THURSDAY,
OCTOBER 4, 1962.

Chaired by the Attorney General.

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Attended by: Gilpatric, [] General Taylor, General Carter,
McCone, Scoville, General Lansdale and Colonel Steakley (part of
the time).

The Attorney General reported on discussions with the President on Cuba; dissatisfied with lack of action in the sabotage field, went on to stress that nothing was moving forward, commented that one effort attempted had failed, expressed general concern over developing situation.

General Lansdale reviewed operations, pointing out that no sabotage had been attempted and gave general impression that things were all right.

McCone then stated that phase one was principally intelligence gathering, organizing and training, that no sabotage was authorized, that one operation against a powerhouse had been contemplated but was discouraged by group, that he had called a meeting to review matters this morning and that he had observed a lack of forward motion due principally to "hesitancy" in government circles to engage in any activities which would involve attribution to the United States.

AG took sharp exception stating the Special Group had not withheld approval on any specified actions to his knowledge, but to the contrary had urged and insisted upon action by the Lansdale operating organization.

There followed a sharp exchange which finally was clarifying inasmuch as it resulted in a reaffirmation of a determination to move forward. In effect it seemed to be the consensus that phase two

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as approved on September 6, was now outmoded, that more dynamic action was indicated, that hesitancy about overflights must be re-considered (this to be commented on later in this memorandum),

[REDACTED]

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As a result, General Lansdale was instructed to give consideration to new and more dynamic approaches, the specific items

[REDACTED]

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With respect to overflights, the NRO and Colonel Steakley were instructed to prepare and present to the Special Group on next Tuesday at a special meeting alternate recommendations for overflights. These to include the use of U-2s on complete sweeps (as contrasted with peripheral or limited missions), the use of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] the use of 101s or other reconnaissance planes on a low level, intermediate level, and high level missions, and other possible reconnaissance operations.

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Consideration was given to stating publicly that we propose to overfly Cuba in the interest of our own security and the security of the Western Hemisphere, and then to proceed even though doing so involved risk.

It was the consensus that we could not accept restrictions which would foreclose gaining all reasonable knowledge of military installations in Cuba.

During the meeting McCone reviewed the earlier meeting with General Lansdale, and pointed out to the group that this meeting clarified General Lansdale's authority over the entire MONGOOSE operation and that the CIA organization was responsive to his policy and operational guidance, and this was thoroughly understood.

- 2 -

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Consideration was given to the existing guidelines and it was the consensus that the August 1st guidelines for phase two were inadequate and new guidelines must be considered.

John A. McCone
Director

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4 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on
Operation MONGOOSE, 4 October 1962

PRESENT: The Attorney General; [] Mr. Gilpatric, General
Taylor, General Lansdale; Mr. McCone and General Carter;

1. The Attorney General opened the meeting by saying that higher authority is concerned about progress on the MONGOOSE program and feels that more priority should be given to trying to mount sabotage operations. The Attorney General said that he wondered if a new look is not required at this time in view of the meager results, especially in the sabotage field. He urged that "massive activity" be mounted within the entire MONGOOSE framework. There was a good deal of discussion about this, and General Lansdale said that another attempt will be made against the major target which has been the object of three unsuccessful missions, and that approximately six new ones are in the planning stage.



2. Mr. McCone then said that he gets the impression that high levels of the government want to get on with activity but still wish to retain a low noise level. He does not believe that this will be possible. Any sabotage would be blamed on the United States. In this connection, he cited the enormous number of telephone calls that had been directed at CIA at the time that the skin divers landed in Eastern Cuba and at the time Cuban exile students shot up the apartment house. He urged that responsible officials be prepared to accept a higher noise level if they want to get on with operations.

In partial rebuttal, the Attorney General said that the reasons people were so concerned at the times mentioned were: (a) the fact that the skin divers were Americans, and (b) that the student



- 2 -

activity was irresponsible and foolish, and if either of these had in fact been engineered by the U.S. it would have been a great mistake. He went on to say responsible people do wish to get on with operations but want to relate the possibility of attributability to the importance of the particular undertaking. He also questioned whether we are going down the right road or whether "more direct action" is not indicated. He urged that alternative and imaginative plans be developed for accomplishing the overall objective.

3. Returning to [] point about the necessity of massive activity coming from within, Mr. McCone pointed out that internal security ~~measures~~ are now so rigid that internal uprisings are sure to be brutally suppressed. It was agreed that the current guidelines do not call for inciting such an uprising.

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4. Mr. McCone and General Carter explained the tremendous efforts which are necessary to insure that an operation such as the sabotage one previously authorized cannot be pinned directly on the U.S. After considerable discussion, the Group agreed that it is not necessary to go to such extreme lengths to guarantee non-attributability and that short cuts will be acceptable.

5. Mr. Gilpatric reported that Defense is now working hard on establishing a Cuban brigade. Recruits will be trained for four or five months and will then be on call for any future action.

6. General Taylor reported that the Joint Staff is refining various military contingency plans, based on a variety of possible situations. Such situations include: Soviet action against Berlin; presence of Bloc offensive weapons in Cuba; attack against Guantanamo; a popular uprising; armed Cuban subversion in the Hemisphere; and the establishment of a direct threat to the U.S.

7. The Group then turned to the subject of reconnaissance of Cuba. (Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley joined the Group for this part of the discussion.) It was pointed out that the Agency is now restricted to using its high performance vehicle in the southeast quadrant of Cuba, because of the SAM sites. It was questioned whether this is a reasonable restriction at this time, particularly when the SAMs are almost certainly not operational.

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- 3 -

The result of this discussion was that it was agreed that DOD and CIA should get together on recommendations for targets within Cuba that require coverage and on recommendations as to how to achieve this coverage. A meeting was set for next Tuesday, at which time DOD and CIA should be prepared to discuss all possibilities, including requirements, capabilities, vulnerabilities, etc.

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9. It was agreed that the Attorney General should act as Chairman of the Special Group (Augmented) at least for the time being.

10. It was agreed that four major points emerged from today's discussion:

- a. We ought to go all out for increased intelligence.
- b. There should be considerably more sabotage.
- c. Restrictions on attributability can be relaxed so that training and other preparations can be subject to some short cuts.
- d. All efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches to the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime.

[Redacted Signature]

Thomas A. Parrott

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cc: General Lansdale